RE: Complicated Disclosure Scenario

From: NP-GEE-CLOUGH AARON (NP-GEE-CLOUGH_AARONat_private)
Date: Thu Jan 17 2002 - 06:51:35 PST

  • Next message: Giurgiu Sergiu: "Re: Complicated Disclosure Scenario"

    I would contact someone like the vuln-help folks at security focus, CERT,
    etc.  Not that I'm trying to shill for them, but this seems like an ideal
    situation where a respected, independent group (which is what they are
    supposed to be) can step in and club the vendor until they get a clue.  If
    the vendor still doesn't respond, then I think you should release an
    advisory.
    
    Yeah, people are going to be pissed if the vendor doesn't have a fix.  But,
    I think contacting a neutral third party (or more than one) in an attempt to
    get the vendor to recognize the problem will show that you are being
    responsible about the vulnerability.  If the vendor chooses to continue to
    ignore the situation, let them face the media.
    
    Aaron
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Josha Bronson [mailto:dmuzat_private]
    Sent: Wednesday, January 16, 2002 10:01 PM
    To: vuln-devat_private
    Subject: Complicated Disclosure Scenario
    
    
    Greetings fellow security folk,
    
    I would like to gather some opinions on a not so theoretical disclosure
    scenario. Please for the sake of focused discussion keep your replies
    related to the specific scenario that I am proposing and not alternate
    opinions on disclosure in general.
    
    The situation is thus. I have discovered a bug in a major software
    vendors application. Initially the bug presented itself as a way to
    crash the application, i.e. a DoS condition. Upon further research I
    determined that I was able to overwrite some return addresses by
    formating the overflow in a specific way. As we all know this means that
    there is the possibility that this could allow code to be executed on
    the remote system.
    
    At this point I contacted the vendor to alert them to the existence of
    this problem. After exchanging multiple emails, in which I tediously
    outlined the DoS condition and *potential* exploit situation I was told
    that they would wait until I determined if code could be exploited
    before they began creating an advisory or even working on a patch. 
    
    I informed this vendor, who is by no means short on resources, that I
    might not be able to successfully make that determination due to
    constraints on my time (after all I do this for fun) and ability, as
    this problem exists on an architecture that I have very little
    experience with. 
    
    I encouraged the vendor to begin their own investigation. They ignored
    this, and again stated that they would await my results.
    
    This is the problem as it sits. If I reach out to "the community" for
    additional assistance with researching this bug I might as well just send
    out an advisory. If I release an advisory the vendor will most likely
    not have a patch ready, they will feel violated and the user base will
    be left open to exploitation with no fix. If I do nothing, the problem
    persists and nothing gets accomplished, and maybe someone with not so
    good intentions discovers the same bug and uses it to do harm.
    
    So, what would you do?
    
    -- 
    Josha Bronson
    dmuzat_private
    AngryPacket Security
    



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