Re: CGI THREAT: Malicious data injection into Perl modules.

From: jon schatz (jonat_private)
Date: Thu Jan 24 2002 - 14:47:38 PST

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    On Thu, 2002-01-24 at 06:30, Onesphorf hass wrote:
    > Feedback is wanted, I don't consider it done yet :)
    
    Ok.
    
    >If we can trick the CGI
    > script to add code into the module, chances are that
    > we will be able to execute commands.
    
    Um, if you could actually (remotely) insert code into a perl module,
    then the site you speak of has many problems. 99% of admins install perl
    modules as root, which should make the files writable only by root. To
    insert code into them would imply that your webserver process is also
    running as root. Bad idea. 
    
    > % nc localhost 80
    > GET /cgi-bin/xXXx.pl?user=0nesphorf;'touch /tmp/test'
    > HTTP/1.0
    > What I did was to include a command with backticks in
    > a context
    > that the CGI did not expect, which fooled it into
    > writing the data
    > into the CGI.pm module, which also made it execute the
    > command
    > due to the backticks which has a special meaning to
    > Perl.
    
    I'm not exactly sure what this particular script you speak of does, but
    anyone using CGI.pm would most likely use the built-in param() method to
    get name:value pairs. And Lincoln Stein is a lot smarter than this.
    param() returns the following for your example:
    
    	user = 0nesphorf
    	`touch /tmp/test` = undef
    
    Furthermore, in order for this code to execute, it would have to be
    eval()'d . And experienced (and even not-so experienced) perl
    programmers stay away from eval()ing unverified values.
    
    Even furthermore, taint checking (ie, perl -T) will refuse to execute
    this code in an eval block until it has been validated. Experienced perl
    coders use taint checking.
    
    So this "new method of CGI exploitation" is nothing more than sloppy
    coding on the vendor's side. All data recieved from the network should
    be verified by the cgi on the other end. You yourself said this only
    works with data that "the CGI did not expect"; it is a programmer's job
    to expect everything.
    
    -jon
    
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