I realize the threat is not huge but, some IDS consoles such as demarc call whois from a web interface. If you have a poorly secured IDS console an attacker could utilize an exploit in whois to run code on your IDS console with the same permissions as a web user. Again, this is not Earth shattering, and a lot would have to be 'broke' already for an attacker to get much out of it, but it's atleast worth mentioning. -Blake On 31 Jan 2002, jon schatz wrote: > On Thu, 2002-01-31 at 08:37, ladd harris wrote: > > Testing the whois -p i also get a core dump on red > > hat 7.1....tried two machines both seem effected. > > whether it can be exploited i do not still need to do > > more tests...... > > but what are you going to exploit? i found this bug a while ago, but > never reported it because > > 1) the (newer) whois-1.0.9-1 rpm fixed the problem, and > 2) whois isn't setuid. and never needs to be > > so at most, you're talking about executing code as yourself, which you > can do without a buffer overflow. > > -jon > > -- > jonat_private || www.divisionbyzero.com > gpg key: www.divisionbyzero.com/pubkey.asc > think i have a virus?: www.divisionbyzero.com/pgp.html > "You are in a twisty little maze of Sendmail rules, all confusing." >
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