Interesting. When we had our DocuTech installed a year ago, we made it clear to Xerox that we would be changing the local admin password on the NT box -- it was a requirement for them joining the device to our domain. No Sun box in our configuration. Of course, the installers are tech people with little or no knowledge of security. The developers really didn't want to hear our complaints, either. I would think that returning (or threatening to return) the product to the vendor would solve the problem quite nicely, if no other method does. Cheers Darren W. MacDonald -----Original Message----- From: J Edgar Hoover [mailto:zorchat_private] Sent: May 17, 2002 2:50 PM To: vuln-devat_private Cc: bugtraqat_private Subject: Xerox DocuTech problems I'm forwarding this for people who would like to remain anonymous. This case illustrates why software product vendors should be held legally and financially accountable for the security problems caused by their reckless and sometimes arrogant disregard of known problems. Xerox replied with a document mirrored at http://totally.righteous.net/jedgar/overview_of_security.pdf which doesn't address many of the problems, and states that the ultimate responsibility for security lies with the customer. Kudos to Xerox for setting a new standard of incompetence. Begin forwarded (and edited) message ------------------------------------------ The model is a Xerox DocuTech 6110 or 6115. These puppies are not old-fashioned optical copiers but basically two units, a high-speed scanner and a high speed laser printer. The laser printer is controlled by a dual-processor Sun Uitra 60 running Solaris 8. The Scanner is controlled by an Intel box running Windows NT. The scanner sends jobs via ftp to the printer. Jobs can also be sent to the printer via lpd through a windows print driver or other means. So, they install it, first thing we do is ask what the root password is for the Solaris box. "Oh, no problem, it's "service!" -- it's the same for all of our machines." WTF? First thing I say is "We will want to change that." "No, you can't. It will probably break things." Well, this puppy is WIDE OPEN like you wouldn't believe. Everything imaginable is running and listening, including such arcane services like sprayd. Then I do a "rpcinfo -p" and see a shitload of unknown RPC services running. But best yet, showmount -e reveals numerous directories exported to the entire world, world writable! The NT box Administrator account password is "administ" and is wide open, so anyone can connect to C$. Copies of all jobs scanned are saved in case they are needed to be rerun later, so anyone wanting to grab that document doesn't have to wait for it to appear in the spool dir of the Solaris box, just grab it from the scanner box at your leisure. Go to the server's http port and there's a complete web page which is very helpful for allowing you to submit jobs over the web and directly into the "print now" queue so an operator doesn't even have to approve it before it prints out. Imagine the fun you can have. Also, there's a very helpful job history so you can see who has been copying what, all anonymous, no authentication required. So, we lock the box down tight, installing ssh, disabling telnet, finger, echo, chargen, and other shit you wouldn't believe. Also installed security updates from Microsoft on the NT box. Xerox comes in today and has a fit and starts to reinstall everything from scratch. And scanning for these puppies would be easy as pie. Just do a finger against a block of addresses for xrxusr account and if it replies, you got yourself one... ------------------------------------------
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