Re: 10th anniversary of the Internet Worm

From: Rich Kulawiec (rskat_private)
Date: Tue Nov 03 1998 - 21:23:41 PST

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    On Mon, Nov 02, 1998 at 10:33:51PM -0500, Gregory Newby wrote:
    > Lest we forget, today was the 10th anniversary of the
    > Internet Worm, released by Robert Tappan Morris, Jr.
    
    I remember -- I was in the trenches that day.  In fact, I'd gone
    into work (the Purdue University Computing Center, a large Unix site)
    early that day because I needed to leave early as well.
    
    I didn't. ;-)  In all the years I've done Unix, that was the
    most exciting 36 hours I went through.
    
    Most of what we did there is documented in Spaf's paper on the
    subject, so you can read that to find out what Dave Stevens and
    Kevin Braunsdorf and George Goble and all of us there at Purdue
    did that day.  (We invented the "condom".  No, really!)
    
    I remember two major concerns that are still with me years later --
    which is why I'm babbling this at bugtraq:
    
    1. We had almost no way to communicate out-of-band with other sites.
    That's why I keep an address/phone/fax book now.  It's far from
    complete, and it's frequently outdated, but I keep it in hardcopy --
    and handy -- against the day when things go foom again.  As you
    pointed out, CERT was formed in part to take on this role, but much
    to my great disappointment, CERT is largely an information black hole,
    and reacts at a glacial pace, far too slowly to be any help in a crisis.
    I also know where several local ISPs are physically located -- guessing
    that the next attack might come when voice/data/cable/etc. are unified
    and that it might take them *all* out.  And I don't think sending them
    postcards will cut it. ;-)
    
    2. Our biggest worry wasn't figuring out who launched it, or why, or
    how it propagated.   Our worry was "Is it destructive (i.e. does it
    deliberately corrupt data)? or is it just meta-destructive (i.e. does
    it corrupt data only as an accidental by-product)?"  Granted, we've got
    a lot more tools that have been developed since then, but if we were
    put in that precise circumstance again by a different threat, I'm not
    sure we're in a position to answer that question quickly and
    accurately.  The best response to this that I've come up with is to do
    on-site and off-site backups with near-religious fervor (including
    verifying them) and to use tools like tripwire regularly.  But I'm not
    satisfied that this adequately addresses the problem of answering that
    same question under severe time pressure.
    
    ---Rsk
    Rich Kulawiec
    rskat_private
    



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