KDE Screensaver vulnerability

From: Christian Esken (eskenat_private)
Date: Wed Nov 18 1998 - 14:11:06 PST

  • Next message: pedwardat_private: "Re: KDE Screensaver vulnerability"

    Dear Bugtraq subscribers,
    
    
    KDE Screensavers are usually running SUID root. Security issues have
    been posted to Bugtraq on Nov 16 1998, under the subject "KDE 1.0's
    klock can be used to gain root priveledges". The KDE team has now
    published  a fix for the KDE1.0 branch and the current branch.
    
    With this change, screensavers and klock are not running SUID anymore.
    This will solve every potential exploit, like misuse of buffer overruns
    to gain root rights or executing a wrong executable under SUID rights.
    
    The following text explains the technique used to solve the problem.
    An advisory for distributors, users and administrators follows the
    technical description.
    
    
    Technique
    ---------
    An authentification program, kcheckpass, has been introduced. This
    is a separate, helper program, that runs SUID and is called each
    time a password has to be checked. The password is passed via
    STDIN to the program and the result of the authentification
    process is returned in the return code of the program.
    This program is small and supposed to be free from security hazzles.
    
    
    
    
    Advisory
    --------
    Administrators should remove any SUID bit from KDE executables.
    
    After updating to the fixed KDE1.0 tree or to the current KDE,
    administrators should
    1) check the access rights of the installed executables. The
       screensavers must not be installed SUID anymore. If in doubt,
       remove the SUID bits manually by a suitable command, like
       "chmod -s *.kss klock" under Linux.
    2) check the access rights of the kcheckpass program. This program
       should only be installed SUID root under certain authentification
       systems, like the shadow password suite.
    3) Distributions using the shadow password system can be made more
       secure by creating a "shadow" group and setting the access rights
       of /etc/shadow and kcheckpass like in the following example:
    
     -rw-r-----   1 root     shadow        746 Sep  2 21:35 /etc/shadow
     -rwxr-sr-x   1 root     shadow       4720 Nov 17 22:32 /opt/kde/bin/kcheckpass
    
       Distributors are strongly encouraged to follow this scheme. This
       way, the kcheckpass is running under the effective user id of the user
       itself and the effective group "shadow". With this, kcheckpass has only
       one additional right against regular users: The right to read /etc/shadow.
       Attackers won't be able to make wider use of "kcheckpass".
    
    
    
    Availability of the fix
    -----------------------
    The patches are already integrated in the KDE1.0 and the KDE1.1 branches.
    You can use cvs/cvsup to get current sources. You can also get the patch
    from KDE's ftp Server ftp://ftp.kde.org and its mirrors, which you can apply
    against a clean KDE1.0 kdebase package.
    It has been uploaded under the name kdebase1.0-klock-patch and should
    show up soon on a suitable place on KDE's ftp Server. The precise location
    will be announced later, for example http://www.kde.org/news_dyn.html will
    provide this information as soon as it available.
    
    
    Christian Esken <eskenat_private>ÿ
    



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