In some mail from Ben Laurie, sie said: > > D. J. Bernstein wrote: > > Certainly setuid programs require a great deal of care. They've been > > involved in many security disasters, though far fewer than (for example) > > world-writable directories. The security community would love to see > > another portable IPC mechanism offering guaranteed user identification. > > (I suggest that kernels add a getpeeruid() system call, showing the real > > uid that called connect(), for UNIX-domain sockets and for loopback TCP > > sockets.) However, while we're waiting, we need a few setuid programs. > > What's wrong with the LOCAL_CREDS option on UNIX domain sockets? In a way, that is exactly the type of thing he is referring to, BUT, LOCAL_CREDS must be supplied to be received as opposed to just "looked up" with getpeeruid() (my understanding anyway). Darren
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 14:25:45 PDT