Re: Microsoft Access 97 Stores Database Password as Plaintext

From: Zorkeres . (zorkeresat_private)
Date: Thu Feb 11 1999 - 13:54:14 PST

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    I don't think this is the philosophie to follow.
    If you implement a password scheme for the data base and you market it
    as secure users don't have to take all the step you talk about.
    
    What bugs me more about this "bug" is the little comment you said at the
    end of your post "for what it was orignally intended for -- keeping out
    unsophisticated users."  I don't think I'm the only one here that think
    that should think before making comments like that.
    In other words your saying to all microsoft users , "Microsoft the
    legion of unsophisticated users". I will let the marketing department of
    Microsfot sort that out, anyways that is the only department that really
    work efficiently there. Thinking that way about security is the best way
    to end up with your panths down everyone second.
    
    
    
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    >Reply-To: Paul Leach <paulleat_private>
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    >From:	Paul Leach <paulleat_private>
    >Subject:      Re: Microsoft Access 97 Stores Database Password as
    Plaintext
    >X-To:         Jim Paris <jimat_private>
    >To:	BUGTRAQat_private
    >
    >> -----Original Message-----
    >> From: Jim Paris [mailto:jimat_private]
    >> Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 1999 2:46 PM
    >> To: BUGTRAQat_private
    >> Subject: Re: Microsoft Access 97 Stores Database Password as
    Plaintext
    >>
    >>
    >> > The following text was posted to USENET, and indexed on a
    >> Russian cypherpunk
    >> > site.  I found it when I was doing some work with Access 97
    >> databses.  I
    >> > think you will agree that this particular "feature" makes the
    linked
    >> > database password issue moot.
    >>
    >> Most definately!
    >
    >No, I claim it was _always_ moot. Even if the password were strongly
    >encrypted, the rest of the data in the database is not. So, unless
    you've
    >used ACLs to protect the database, the data in it _is_ available, it's
    just
    >a matter of a some amount of work.
    >
    >Unless the programmer went to a lot of work to obscure the password
    storage,
    >the following procedure should work on nearly any of that generation of
    >applications that pretended to "password protect" their files in the
    absence
    >of file system security:
    >
    >1. Create as small a database/file as possible, with an empty password.
    >2. Copy it.
    >3. Change the password on one copy
    >4. Diff the databases/files -- this will isolate even a strongly
    encrypted
    >encrypted blank password.
    >5. Copy the target
    >5. Copy the encrypted blank password into the same offset in the copy
    of the
    >target database/file.
    >
    >On the other hand, if you used ACLs to protect the database/file, then
    you
    >could use a blank password, and it wouldn't matter.
    >
    >It is a fundamental security principle that effective security checks
    must
    >be enforced by something that can _not_ be bypassed. Since, without
    ACLs or
    >using the password to encrypt the whole database/file, there is no way
    to
    >prevent the password checking from being bypassed, the approach is only
    good
    >for what it was orignally intended for -- keeping out unsophisticated
    users.
    >
    >Paul
    >
    
    
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