Re: Update to ODBC/RDS vulnerabilities

From: David LeBlanc (dleblancat_private)
Date: Wed Sep 22 1999 - 13:38:17 PDT

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    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: rfpat_private [mailto:rfpat_private]
    
    > the permissions on these registry keys are Everyone -> Special Access,
    > which includes Set Value.  This basically means domain users
    > can remotely
    > disable handler and sandbox restrictions by changing the
    > values of these
    > keys.  Hmmm.  I've tested this, and it worked as expected.
    
    You did your testing as an administrator on the machine.  Network
    permissions for the registry are governed by the permissions on
    HKLM\System\CCS\Control\
    SecurePipeServers\winreg, and by the 'Machine' value in the AllowedPaths key
    below it.  Default permissions for winreg key allow only admins to access
    the registry remotely.  Exceptions to this are the AllowedPaths, which are
    governed by the permissions on the keys themselves.  HKLM\Software is not on
    the allowed paths for either the workstation or the server, so this portion
    of what you describe will not work remotely against a default install of
    Windows NT unless administrator access has already been obtained.
    
    It is also generally a good practice to place router filters in front of
    your internet-exposed web servers such that they cannot make outbound
    connections to places where they shouldn't.  People who took such
    precautions found that things such as the .htr overflow didn't work, and
    would prevent your UNC path variant from working.  Turning off the Server
    and Workstation services, as well as unbinding NetBIOS from the external
    interface would also prevent an attack involving an external UNC path from
    working.
    



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