Re: Analysis of Tribe Flood Network

From: der Mouse (mouseat_private)
Date: Thu Dec 09 1999 - 13:44:09 PST

  • Next message: Alfred Huger: "Clarification needed on the snoop vuln(s)"

    > [...], and that some people still haven't realized that a root
    > compromise means *total control* over the systems hard- and
    > software..
    
    Um, not quite - though admittedly pretty close.  The main thing
    cracking root doesn't get you is physical access.  For example, if the
    machine's only disk drive has its write-disable jumper in place, you
    *can't* write to it, you *can't* trojan its executables, even if you
    gained control of not only userland root but the kernel.
    
    That's another thing root access doesn't give you - kernel control.
    It's often a fairly short step, but not always.
    
    > including denial of service, automated compromising of other
    > machines, remote eavesdropping,
    
    All true, assuming the kernel is willing to let root do those things.
    There is no reason the kernel *has* to be willing to put the network
    interface in promiscuous mode at all - indeed, it'd be fairly easy to
    build a kernel that doesn't.  And one box I've been considering putting
    together wouldn't even have a userland to compromise; it's raison
    d'etre (if and when) is going to be a particular form of packet
    forwarding, wholly in-kernel.  No root to crack!
    
    Not that this should render anyone complacent, of course.  A root
    compromise is pretty serious, and on most machines having root *does*
    give you everything you could want.
    
    					der Mouse
    
    			       mouseat_private
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