Re: FireWall-1 FTP Server Vulnerability

From: Lars.Troenat_private
Date: Sat Feb 12 2000 - 02:45:30 PST

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    -----Original Message-----
    From: Check Point Support [mailto:cpsupporat_private]
    Sent: 12. februar 2000 06:01
    To: fw-1-mailinglistat_private
    Subject: [FW1] Check Point News Announcement
    
    
    
    News Announcement:
    http://www.checkpoint.com/techsupport/alerts/pasvftp.html
    
    It has been brought to Check Point's attention that a possible
    vulnerability
    exists in the control of PASV (passive) FTP connections through
    FireWall-1.
    This was developed in a lab environment and requires a specific set of
    conditions to have existed, in order to suceed. Check Point has no
    knowledge
    of its being used against production environments.
    
    Summary of vulnerability:
    FireWall-1's parsing of the FTP control connection was manipulated via
    MTU
    such that a FTP server PASV port number, as processed by FireWall-1, was
    
    associated with the port number of a service with a known security issue
    (in
    this case, ToolTalk port vulnerability on a un-patched Solaris 2.6
    system).
    This enabled the client to exploit the server's vulnerability (i.e., an
    in.ftpd that returned client-controlled data in an error message and
    running
    a possibly unnecessary service: ToolTalk) to gain root access on the
    machine. This vulnerability was reported to BugTrag on Wednesday,
    February
    9th by John MacDonald of DataProtect.
    
    Minimizing the possible threat:
    - Do not enable PASV FTP if not needed.
    - Use the FTP Security Server or HTTP security server for PASV FTP
    connections to internal FTP servers.
    - Those running publicly accessible FTP servers should follow good host
    security practices (e.g., not running additional, possibly unnecessary
    and
    vulnerable services, keeping up with OS and/or application patches).
    - For those using stateful inspection of passive FTP, the following
    patch
    has been supplied.
    
    Patch:
    The patch consists of a new $FWDIR/lib/base.def file that includes a fix
    to
    the problem (the file is compatible with Firewall-1 4.0 SP-5, other
    platforms will be released as soon as possible). The fix involves an
    enforcement on the existence of the newline character at the end of each
    
    packet on the FTP control connection, this will close off the described
    vulnerability. It should be noted that this may cause connectivity
    problems
    (i.e., blocked FTP connections) in the following scenarios:
    
    1. If FTP control messages larger than the MTU (e.g., large PWD) are
    exchanged.
    2. If some FTP clients/servers does not put newline at the end of the
    line.
    3. When passing FWZ encrypted traffic through an intermediate Firewall
    gateway.
    The enforcement can be easily disabled by commenting the following line
    in
    the base.def file (or by restoring the original base.def file):
    #define FTP_ENFORCE_NL
    
    Thank you,
    Check Point Software Technical Services
    



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