Re: Three possible DoS attacks against some IOS versions.

From: Big Poop (ste0000at_private)
Date: Sun Jun 09 2002 - 05:41:25 PDT

  • Next message: SGI Security Coordinator: "Xinet K-Talk Appletalk(tm) xkas vulnerability on IRIX"

    a bit of source code i wrote a couple of month as proof of concept for the 
    HSRP DoS..... needs libpcap installed to sniff the packets to get the 
    authentication details + various other stuff. Spoofed packets are then send 
    to the multicast address informing the group that there is a new router (the 
    hackers machine / fake IP address) that has the top priority 255 thus 
    pre-empting the active router and causing a DoS
    
    the prog runs on linux and was tested on mandrake 8
    
    --------8<--------8<------- from previous post
    an excerpt form RFC 2281 - Cisco HSRP
    
    7. Security Considerations
    
        This protocol does not provide security.  The authentication field
        found within the message is useful for preventing misconfiguration.
        The protocol is easily subverted by an active intruder on the LAN.
        This can result in a packet black hole and a denial-of-service
        attack.  It is difficult to subvert the protocol from outside the
      LAN as most routers will not forward packets addressed to the
      all-routers multicast address (224.0.0.2).
    
    - ----
    
    Cisco is considering using MD5 to improve the protection of HSRP in
    future releases of IOS.
    
    However, there are some other factors that must be considered in
    this context:
    
    - - this vulnerability can be exploited only from the local segment
       (not over the Internet).
    - - the same effect, denial of service, can be produced by using ARP,
       which can not be protected in any way.
    
    The last factor is especially important since it may cause a false
    sense of security if the user is using a hardened version of HSRP as an
    attacker can still disrupt the network by using crafted ARP packets.
    
    Another aspect of this issue is that in its current implementation, HSRP
    doesn't seem to perform a validity check on the IP addresses. This is
    under active investigation as Cisco Bug ID CSCdu38323.
    
    Cisco HSRP documentation can be found at -
    http://www.cisco.com/univercd/cc/td/doc/cisintwk/ics/cs009.htm
    
    - --
    Sharad Ahlawat.
    Product Security Incident Response Team (PSIRT) Incident Manager
    http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt
    Phone:+1 (408) 527-6087 (Land line and Mobile)
    DH/DSS key Id: 0xC12A996C
    Fingerprint: 9A93 2A20 43E5 7F01 2954  C427 1A81 A898 C12A 996C
    
    Complete information on reporting security vulnerabilities in Cisco
    products, obtaining assistance with security incidents, and registering
    to receive security information from Cisco, is available on Cisco's
    Worldwide Web site at http://www.cisco.com/go/psirt.
    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
    Version: GnuPG v1.0.7 (GNU/Linux)
    
    iD8DBQE8/+eLGoGomMEqmWwRAvQuAKDD0QUix/yYu+9R7ZgdJh0AK8pQdACeNa8q
    ENh90WxBZqYLg3sjuLjxE0w=
    =pCHF
    -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
    
    ------8<--------------8<-------------- end of previous post
    
    
    --
    Big Poop
    rootat_private
    
    
    
    _________________________________________________________________
    Join the world’s largest e-mail service with MSN Hotmail. 
    http://www.hotmail.com
    
    
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Mon Jun 10 2002 - 14:25:24 PDT