Undocumented account vulnerability in Avaya P550R/P580/P880/P882 switches

From: Jacek Lipkowski (sq5bpfat_private)
Date: Tue Oct 15 2002 - 07:10:26 PDT

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    Undocumented account vulnerability in Avaya P550R/P580/P880/P882 switches
    
    1. Problem Description
    
    Two undocummented accounts with default passwords allow access via telnet
    and the web interface to Cajun P550R/P580/P880/P882 switches. Both
    accounts give developer access to the switch. The vulnerability can be
    avioded by upgrading to software version 5.3.0 or later and disabling the
    accounts.
    
    2. Tested systems
    
    The following versions were tested and found vulnerable:
    
    Avaya Cajun P580 software version 5.2.14
    
    All previous software versions are assumed to be vulnerable. This
    problem is present in P550R,P580,P880 and P882.
    
    3. Details
    
    The vulnerable firmware installs the following strings into the switch
    configuration by default:
    
    username "root" password encrypted-type1 "$tSfIcnbTP.pxRf7BrhGW31"
    access-type admin
    username "diag" password encrypted-type1 "$PQO.vGxkvDHkEDCJ2YsoD1"
    access-type read-write
    username "manuf" password encrypted-type1 "$seHFLP9b16m2v/534WCk90"
    access-type read-write
    
    The only documented password is for the root user. This user can't
    change the diag and manuf accounts.
    
    The un-documented passwords are:
    
    user	password
    ----	--------
    diag	danger
    manuf	xxyyzz
    
    Both of these accounts give developer access to the switch (read-write
    access-type), which is more priviliged than normal administrative access
    (admin access-type).
    
    4. Recommendations
    
    As always it is good administrative practice to block access to
    administrative interfaces (telnet, web) at the firewall. Upgrading to
    software version 5.3.0 or later and disabling the accounts resolves ths
    issue.
    
    As a temporary workaround download the configuration file via tftp, edit
    out these accounts, or change their password hashes, and upload it to the
    switch.
    
    
    5. Vendor status
    
    AVAYA was informed on 2 Oct 2002. The vendor responded the same day, proved
    responsive and worked promptly on the problem. I have agreed to release the
    information after the release of the official AVAYA advisory. The official
    Avaya advisory was out on 11 Oct 2002. The fixed software is avaliable from the
    Avaya support site http://support.avaya.com.
    
    Official AVAYA security advisories are located at
    http://support.avaya.com/security/
    
    6. Disclaimer
    
    Neither I nor my employer is responsible for the use or misuse of
    information in this advisory.  The opinions expressed are my own and not
    of any company.  Any use of the information is at the user's own risk.
    
    
    Jacek Lipkowski sq5bpfat_private
    
    Andra Co. Ltd.
    ul Wynalazek 6
    02-677 Warsaw, Poland
    http://www.andra.com.pl
    



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