RE: CRIME Senator Hatch - Destroy file swappers' computers

From: Gavin Redshaw (gavin@private)
Date: Thu Jun 19 2003 - 09:46:54 PDT

  • Next message: Christiansen, John (SEA): "RE: CRIME Senator Hatch - Destroy file swappers' computers"

    Justin - cranky though your mail seems, I think that you make some
    interesting points.
    
    It seems that the "war" on terrorism as currently defined is not a war but a
    state of government that will be with us permanently, or until something
    more fashionable comes to Washington. Ask anyone that has lived with
    terrorism (like those "old world" countries Britain w/IRA, Spain w/ETA) and
    you will find that such a war cannot be won until the root cause is
    addressed (and that probably doesn't mean putting more troops into the
    country of source, at least not with Northern Ireland).
    
    In Britain's case no progress was made until they negotiated with the IRA
    (i.e. the terrorists) and attempted to move Northern Ireland towards self
    rule with representation for all and curb the use of British troops in
    Northern Ireland. Meanwhile, personal freedoms in the UK were not merrily
    waved away in the name of some nebulous "war". Indeed there were
    anti-terrorism laws passed, but I don't think anyone kidded themselves that
    they were temporary infringements on personal liberty until the "war" was
    "won". And rather than color codes (which mean little to Joe public), people
    were educated (like in Israel) to be aware of potential problems (such as
    unattended luggage in the subway) and just get on with their lives, calmed
    in the knowledge that they can do some small thing to help increase public
    safety.
    
    Gavin
    
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: owner-crime@private [mailto:owner-crime@private]On Behalf Of
    > Justin Kurynny
    > Sent: Thursday, June 19, 2003 9:00 AM
    > To: Crispin Cowan; crime@private
    > Subject: RE: CRIME Senator Hatch - Destroy file swappers' computers
    >
    >
    > well put, Crispin.
    >
    > to draw an analogy, the Israelis and Palestinians show us how well the
    > "hack back" or "attack back" approach works. those who are not directly
    > involved in the conflict, i.e., innocents and civilians, take the
    > heaviest casualties. the divisions between parties grow, anger feeds an
    > ever growing anger, the problem sickens and festers, and the engagement
    > results in stalemate with enormous costs to both sides.
    >
    > it's amazing how authority (at any level, public and private) tells us
    > not to hit back when we're hit (anyone here remember preschool?), but we
    > nationally set the opposite example with policies like this. it's easier
    > to react than proact, apparently; unfortunately the costs are much
    > greater.
    >
    > so let's continue this tirade, shut down some more schools and choke our
    > kids just a little more. let's give our public educators a pay cut.
    > let's cut funding for communities and parks and libraries. let's build
    > some more prisons, raise the DHS alert level permanently to orange, and
    > install some more expensive and ineffective security measures in
    > airports. maybe with biometrics and a profile on every one of the
    > world's inhabitants we'll really drive fear into the minds of would-be
    > criminals and we'll defeat crime forever.
    >
    > let's all just go on and continue believing that attacking the symptoms
    > will cure the problem. let's start a Fear Fund. we'll criminalize the
    > brown people and then we'll move on to the satan-worshipping white
    > suburban teenagers with nothing to do except gun down a crowded high
    > school cafeteria. then maybe we'll have time to get all those insolent
    > copyright infringers.
    >
    > so yeah, let's hack back. great idea.
    >
    > justin
    >
    > justin kurynny
    > manager of network engineering
    > waggener edstrom, inc.
    >
    > Notice Of Copyright: This content in this email is copyright (c) 2003 by
    > Justin Kurynny. it may not be copied in part or in whole for any
    > purpose. In fact, it may not even be read because reading could lead to
    > retention, which is a biological copy of this material. If I reasonably
    > believe that you are in violation of this copyright, your computer's
    > bootstrap will spontaneously melt down. You will also be put on a
    > mandatory prescription of rophynol if I deem it appropriate.
    >
    > *
    >
    > -----Original Message-----
    > From: Crispin Cowan [mailto:crispin@private]
    > Sent: Wednesday, June 18, 2003 11:43 PM
    > To: Christiansen, John (SEA)
    > Cc: 'Dorning, Kevin E - DI-3'; crime@private
    >
    > Christiansen, John (SEA) wrote:
    >
    > >I don't think this is funny at all. I have actually been doing some
    > >theoretical work on active defense (or "hack back") as a potentially
    > >legitimate response to some kinds of network-based threats. While I am
    > >not convinced it is necessarily proper (and am also not convinced it is
    >
    > >necessarily improper, either), it is very clear it would need to be
    > >undertaken carefully, with a high degree of reliability in target
    > >identification and proportionality of response to risk, where other
    > >recourse is not reasonably possible. This kind of statement at best
    > >reflects a lack of thought about or insight into the issues, and at
    > >worst may be taken by irresponsible intellectual property claimants (or
    >
    > >wannabes) as a license to do what they want.
    > >
    > Uh, oookaaayyy .... sounds to me like you haven't thought about this
    > very much. Attacks are almost *always* launched from a computer
    > belonging to an innocent 3rd party, who just happened to have been
    > cracked before you were. So if you "hack back", you almost certainly are
    > committing an offense against an innocent party who has already been
    > victimized by the attacker.
    >
    > To be fair, John did say "with a high degree of reliability in target
    > identification." But that's problematic: with an attack coming from a
    > remote machine, where you have no access, and the legitimate owner is
    > very likely both inattentive and clueless, just how is it that you might
    > reliably establish identity?
    >
    > So if you do the risk analysis, "hack back" is almost *always* the wrong
    > thing to do.
    >
    > Crispin
    >
    > --
    > Crispin Cowan, Ph.D.           http://immunix.com/~crispin/
    > Chief Scientist, Immunix       http://immunix.com
    >             http://www.immunix.com/shop/
    >
    >
    >
    >
    >
    



    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Thu Jun 19 2003 - 10:25:45 PDT