Re: Keybord Entry Capture Programs

From: JohnNicholsonat_private
Date: Thu Jul 12 2001 - 21:07:13 PDT

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    Mike's answer is basically correct, both with regard to the legality of 
    monitoring and the practical consideration that if you monitor and record 
    something, someone else may be able to use it against you.  Your Monitoring 
    Policy should be developed in cooperation with your HR dept. and your 
    company's legal dept.  Don't just go slapping keyboard monitors (or other 
    forms of monitoring) on your employees without coordinating with those other 
    depts.
    
    Sections 2511 and 2520 of Title 18 of the U.S. Code create criminal and civil 
    liability for improper interception of wire, oral and electronic 
    communications.  Although there are exceptions under both the U.S. Code and 
    under state laws for system providers, relying on these exceptions is 
    unnecessary if your company puts in place an appropriate Monitoring Policy.  
    By explicitly requiring user consent to monitoring, your company can make 
    access to your network and systems conditional on users accepting such 
    monitoring.  All users of your network and systems (whether employees, third 
    party contractors or customers) should be required to consent to monitoring.  
    
    Your Monitoring Policy should specify that your company has the right to 
    monitor all network traffic and all data stored on equipment used for company 
    purposes that is provided to an employee or contractor by the company or by 
    any third party contractor.  Both your authorized use policy ("AUP") (for 
    internal users) and your TOS (for any external users) should reference this 
    policy and explain it.  In addition to informing users via the AUP and the 
    TOS, logon banners should reference the Monitoring Policy and state that 
    access to the network or system is subject to monitoring at any time and for 
    any reason, and that by accessing and using the network or system, the user 
    is explicitly agreeing to such monitoring.
    
    Monitoring traffic and behavior on your systems can allow you to detect 
    misconduct in real time, and can create logs that will be useful in an 
    investigation and/or prosecution.  Monitoring can also decrease behavior such 
    as employee web surfing or other violations of your company's authorized use 
    policy.  However, you must remember that anything you record can potentially 
    be used against you, too.  Records of explicit or otherwise discriminatory 
    chats or emails could be used as evidence of a hostile workplace in a lawsuit 
    against the company.  How much easier would the tobacco litigation have been 
    with email and IM records?  This is why your HR and legal departments need to 
    be involved.
    
    In the future, the increased use of personal technology (e.g., cell phones, 
    PDAs, etc.) to access corporate systems will require increased and more 
    specific consents.  If, for example, you open up your document management 
    system so that it is web accessible, an employee with a PDA and a wireless 
    modem can download confidential information.  Access to that system could 
    require explicit consent from the user to monitoring of the activity and an 
    agreement to provide access to the PDA on demand.  (Note, such access will be 
    easier if your company owns the PDA and provides it to the employee.)
    
    I wrote an article on employee monitoring for USENIX; login: about a year 
    ago.  Rather than waste the bandwidth sending that to everyone, if you're 
    interested in receiving it, please drop me a separate note.
     
    John
    
    In a message dated 7/12/2001 8:53:36 PM Eastern Daylight Time, 
    mikebrownat_private writes:
    
    > > My question is twofold:
    >  >
    >  > 1.)  What are the legal ramifications (real or potential) of a keyboard
    >  > entry capture program installation on corporate desktops?  Do civil
    >  > issues exist?  Must one have clear evidence of wrong-doing before silent
    >  > installation?  Precedence?  How well does this type of 'evidence'
    >  > present itself in the courts?  How to 'prepare' outcome for Chain of
    >  > Evidence compliance?
    >  >
    >  
    >  IANAL  but courts have ruled that company owned computers can be searched
    >  and monitored. Even if you look at the larger picture it is my 
    understanding
    >  that company phones are open to wiretapping and the like. It only makes
    >  sense to assume that the same would extend to the computer.
    >      From a practical stand point I wouldn't just start installing 
    keyloggers
    >  everywhere. Not only do you have privacy issues but security issues as 
    well.
    >  Are you confident that the computer that is being monitored to secure? The
    >  log file could contain very sensitive data the would have been housed on a
    >  server that you watch closely, but if left on the desktop it could be very
    >  vulnerable.
    >      In addition you may not want to collect data at that level. Allot of
    >  companies have been embarrassed by ICQ logs or secret memos that where 
    never
    >  meant to see the light of day. If you record it, it can be collected by
    >  third parties, i.e. courts and reporters.
    >      if you feel the need to install it on an employees computer send out a
    >  memo to everyone saying that it can be done, this might tip off the 
    employee
    >  but it will also make people watch what they do. It's sort of like leaving 
    a
    >  kid at home, if you tell them that they are being watch by the old lady
    >  across the street they might just behave on their own.
    >  
    >  Mike Brown
    
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