RE: Future trends in computer forensics

From: Robinson, Sonja (SRobinsonat_private)
Date: Fri Oct 18 2002 - 11:15:30 PDT

  • Next message: Eoghan Casey: "Re: Future trends in computer forensics"

    Sorry it is long , but there are a number of points and assumptions to be
    made to address the original questions.  
    
    
    Forensics -I'll define as a process of objectively evaluating a crime scene
    (or violation of civil/copr codes/scenes) with the intent to present the
    facts as they relate to a specific incident or group of incidents.  The
    objective is to present all of the facts (or as much as possible) so that
    factual (hopefully irrefutable) conclusions can be drawn.  A crime scene can
    be physical, such as a muder scene or it can be digital such as stalking
    over the Internet or espionage.  Some issues can obviously transcend both
    the physical and the digital.
    
    As I see it, I believe that forensics will become more commonplace
    throughout both the private and public sectors.  There are a number of
    groups working otgether to share this knowledge, i.e HTCIA, CFID, RCFG, etc.
    Until rcently, IT security was not given the support that it needed (and
    IMHO still needs more).  As IT security becomes more established, private
    and public sectors are coming to realize that they need to log and monitor
    digital events.  They need to be able to investigate things both for
    internal issues as well as external.  Corporations are realizing that they
    can't afford to have people surfing the net.  It costs money in lost
    productivity and potentially opens them up to law suits.   They need to
    determine who has been looking at what, when and why to ensure CIA
    (confidenitality, integrity an availability).  In fact I have seen a
    significant incerase in such requests from various companies to their IT
    depts.  Public/Leo-wise, they did not have enough knowledge and budget to do
    much.  That too is changing.  Street detectives are getting more savy as
    their theft cases involve the Net.  Identitiy theft and credit card fruad
    are increasing and therefore the necessity for forensics and savy are more
    necessary for them to complete their jobs.  I have done a lot of pro bono
    for some detectives to help them out.
    
    Crypto-wise.  Not going to make too much of a difference.  Avergae user
    still can't figure it out.  XP is not going to be wide spread for a number
    of years (how many people are still using 95/98/me??)  People won't
    implement it because they don't know how, don't want to, have "nothing to
    hide", or are just lazy.  Or they may forget their password which would
    probably be pretty simple anyway to crack.  And I can just put keystroke
    logging on their machine anyway or sniff it in most cases.  Corporate - they
    are still on NT.  Just migrating to 2000.  XP won't be rolled out to most
    also for a number of years.  And PGP and other encryption has been avaiable
    for years and 99.9% of the population does not employ it anyway.  While I
    see it becoming slightly more prevalent, I don't think it will be signifcant
    enough to cause a major problem for investigations.  
    
    Heck, I'm still trying to get people/corps to get rid of old accounts and
    pick a good password.
    
    So to sum it up - forensics will become more prevalent and their will
    eventually become a certifying body to govern it to ensure that people are
    truly "forensic experts" since it is imperative to investigate in a manner
    that can be presented in court.  Who knows what you might find when you
    start to dig.
    
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Ralph S. Hoefelmeyer [mailto:ralph.hoefelmeyerat_private]
    Sent: Friday, October 18, 2002 12:52 PM
    To: Gary L. Palmer; Morris, Rod
    Cc: forensicsat_private
    Subject: RE: Future trends in computer forensics
    
    
    I'll chime in here - forensics has historically been applied in a legal
    sense, which is slow, geared toward "beyond a reasonable doubt".  In the
    real world of business and intelligence - there are different standards,
    i.e., will it help us in a business sense or do we think the target needs to
    be serviced - room to be wrong, and while not indifferent to being wrong,
    that is why we have the term "collateral damage".  Different paradigms.  The
    time criticality mentioned below is very important, especially when reacting
    to Internet threats - your response time is measured in minutes now - search
    on warhol worm.
    Ralph
    
    Ralph S. Hoefelmeyer, CISSP
    Senior Engineer
    WorldCom GPE
    719.535.4576 Office
    "Security is a process, not a product" Bruce Schneier
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Gary L. Palmer [mailto:palmergat_private]
    Sent: Friday, October 18, 2002 8:02 AM
    To: Morris, Rod
    Cc: forensicsat_private
    Subject: Re: Future trends in computer forensics
    
    
    Rod,
    I work at the Air Force Research lab in Rome, NY. From a conceptual, basic
    research perspective some items that are being worked on that will have
    significant impact in our field (Digital Evidence or Digital Forensic
    Science/Engineering - some would cringe at the phrase) present real
    challenges.
    Some are:
    - Understanding digital transformations - the detailed trial of processing
    that
    is employed from molecular storage of magnetic forces as voltages to the
    representation of that information on a monitor as human readable text. Not
    many
    understand the full spectrum of events. It may tell us volumes. This is true
    especially in light of Daubert/Kumho and FRE 702
    - The application of Lockard's Exchange Principle in the digital realm. Does
    it
    apply? This famous basic rule of all traditional forensic analysis has yet
    to be
    verified or falsified when considering forensic computer/network
    investigations.
    
    - Authorship attribution: many forensic disciplines are employed mostly to
    ascertain two important probative items (there are other items of course),
    1.
    The irrefutable identity of the victim, and 2. the incontestable identity of
    the
    perpetrator. To date that has been very difficult to do in the digital
    world.
    Applications of Forensic Linguistics and Stylometery are rising to meet the
    digital challenge.
    - The application of rigorous, relatively slow moving Law enforcement
    techniques
    (mostly ex post facto) in forensic analysis of near-real-time operational
    environments (business and military).  This is a matter of time criticality
    and
    overall perspective. Prosecution verses Availability of service.  Which one
    drives.
    - Digital Forensic Analysis in a wireless/cellular environment. RIM
    Blackberry,
    Bluetooth, 802.11x, CDMA, GSM, 3G, 4GSM, etc.. Very complex and challenging.
    
    $.02
    Gary
    
    "Morris, Rod" wrote:
    
    > Hello everyone,
    >
    > I've been asked to say a few words for an interview concerning "the future
    > of computer forensics". Amongst other things I thought I'd mention the
    > challenges posed by (IMHO) an increasing use of encryption amongst users,
    > developments in forensic tools (such as EnCase Enterprise edition) and an
    > increasing awareness of the legal issues surrounding computer forensic
    > investigation.
    >
    > This specific interview aside, I'd be very interested to hear other
    opinions
    > on where we're going and what others working in this field think the major
    > technological challenges and developments are likely to be over the next
    few
    > years...
    >
    > Kind regards,
    >
    > Rod
    >
    > --
    > Rod Morris
    > KPMG
    > Forensic Technology
    > tel +31 (0) 20 656 8884
    > fax +31 (0) 20 656 7790
    > e-mail Morris.Rodat_private
    > X.400 c=NL;a=CONCERT;p=KPMG;s=morris;g=rod
    >
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