In some email I received from tqbfat_private, sie wrote: > > > > Do not rely on switches because switches are not designed for > > >security. > > > > Based on that logic, there's just about nothing you CAN > > rely on, except death, taxes, and sendmail bugs. > > I don't think that's very fair. It seems obvious to me that some systems > have more attention paid to them for security (VMailer, for instance) than > others (like Sendmail). My confidence in VMailer is much greater than my > confidence in Sendmail, to the point where I'd be willing to consider > deploying VMailer in circumstances where Sendmail's lack of reliability is > prohibitive. And you're being more fair than Marcus ? Sendmail's origins are well know. When it was written, it wasn't written with security as the #1 focus and the next major release (8.9) is being touted as primarily anti-spam - i.e. it's not being sold for its security. Why not ? Because to many people, correct delivery of email is far more important than the program being "secure". I'd even go so far as to say that delivery of email across the Internet is still more important than WWW. The point being a secure product is no good if it doesn't work correctly 100% (or close to) of the time. Darren
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 12:56:47 PDT