Re: DMZ design - Exchange, SQL, & DCOM

From: Mikael Olsson (mikael.olssonat_private)
Date: Sun Feb 06 2000 - 09:21:46 PST

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    Michael Borkin wrote:
    > 
    > Mikael Olsson wrote:
    > > I'd recommend placing a mail forwarder with content screening
    > > capabilities in a SEPARATE DMZ, and the Exchange server on
    > > the internal network.
    > 
    > Why do you recommend a seperate DMZ just for mail forwarding?  
    
    I recommed separate segments for just about everything :-)
    
    The reason for the separate DMZ is that you don't want to expose
    your mail forwarder to your web server. The risk that someone
    will hack your web server through the firewall is much greater
    than the risk of someone hacking your mail forwarder through the
    firewall. However, with the two placed on the same LAN, hacking
    the mail forwarder most likely becomes a simple task.
    
    Also, by placing the mail forwarder in a separate DMZ, you 
    can be reasonably sure that the SMTP traffic going into
    your exchange server is actually coming from the mail forwarder,
    and not from the web server doing some serious IP and/or
    MAC spoofing.
    
    Uhm.. That's it I guess :-)
    
    /Mike
    
    -- 
    Mikael Olsson, EnterNet Sweden AB, Box 393, S-891 28 ÖRNSKÖLDSVIK
    Phone: +46-(0)660-105 50           Fax: +46-(0)660-122 50
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