Re: Nimda esponsibility - Laying appropriatel - implied warranty of sale

From: H C (keydet89at_private)
Date: Fri Sep 28 2001 - 07:29:40 PDT

  • Next message: fosterd : "Re: Nimda esponsibility - Laying appropriatel - implied warranty of sale"

    > You really want to put them out of 
    > business?  STOP USING THEIR PRODUCTS.  How many
    > other ways can it be said?
    
    Amen.
    
    > It is not like there aren't alternatives out 
    > there.  There are other OSes (free & non), other 
    > browsers, other free media players, other free
    > office suites, etc.
    
    I have StarOffice installed on a Win2K system.  It
    works reasonably well, so far, and I've used it to
    edit Word and PPT docs that I've transferred from
    other machines.
    
    > But as consultants, 
    > contractors, and vendors we are not pushing our 
    > customers to make the change.  
    
    
    > Time for a better solution.  
    
    For the time being, can't we recommend to our clients
    such things such as ACLs and monitoring?  How about
    developing, implementing, and following security
    policies and procedures?  Of the few sites that I've
    seen that actually have such things, managers have
    done very little for holding admins responsible for
    actually following the procedures.  Ex: Backup
    procedures clearly state that backups will be verified
    and stored in an off-site location.  Management did
    little to provide an off-site location, so admins were
    taking copies home.  When an incident occurred, they
    found out that the backups hadn't been verified...
    
    The point is this...if senior management is serious
    about security as a whole, they'd provide the
    necessary resources...adequate numbers of personnel,
    training, etc.  Many times, a lot doesn't get done b/c
    the admin staff (a) is too busy w/ helpdesk ops, and
    (b) wouldn't really know what to do anyway (how many
    times have I asked data center folks for the IIS web
    logs and gotten back three files, all ending in
    .evt??).
    
    >      If you are serious about this effort, then 
    > education and proof are the keys to making it work. 
    
    Sure.
    
    > Build two boxes, one MS and one Linux for example.
    
    It's common knowledge that an adequately
    trained/experienced MS admin can lock down a box as
    much as an adequately trained/experienced Linux admin.
    Setting up such boxes and launching the same attacks
    against them shows what exactly?  The security
    configuration of a single host has only a very little
    to do with the overall information security posture of
    the infrastructure.  Firewall and router ACLs,
    NAT'ing, VLANs, network device configuration,
    user/admin security awareness, locked server room
    doors...these all play a part.  
    
    The issue of susceptibility to malware (worms,
    viruses, etc) isn't so much one of which products are
    employed, but rather _how_ they are employed. 
    
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