What constitutes authorized server access? - was Re: RPAT - Realtime Proxy Abuse Triangulation

From: Gary Flynn (flynngnat_private)
Date: Tue Dec 31 2002 - 05:20:58 PST

  • Next message: tcleary2at_private: "Re: RPAT - Realtime Proxy Abuse Triangulation"

    Rob Shein wrote:
    
    >This is fundamentally flawed logic.  To cite a physical-world
    >equivalent, just because a door isn't locked doesn't make entering it
    >against the wishes of the occupant anything other than breaking and
    >entering, plus unlawful entry if you have illegal intent upon entering.
    >The law does not recognize that failure to properly defend against
    >criminal behavior means that you surrender all the protective means
    >afforded by the criminal justice system.
    >
    So which doors are people permitted to enter without explicit permission?
    HTTP server doors? ICMP echo server doors? Remote Procedure Call
    doors? Universal Plug-n-Play doors? Auth (113) doors? Netbios doors?
    Server Location Protocol doors?
    
    Or is it more complicated? Netbios doors as long as its not C$? Kazaa
    doors as long as its not at the root directory?
    
    What if an organization wants to make SNMP read access available
    for some reason. Whether for network performance information or
    an SNMP coffee pot status.
    
    Intent is easily provided in telnet and web sessions through common user
    interfaces with login banners but that is not the case for other protocols.
    
    Maybe we need a new RFC governing "intent notification" so that all
    servers offering services to a network will state whether the server is 
    meant
    for public use during session negotiation. A virtual "private property-
    no trespassing" sign. Cooperating client programs accessing a "private" 
    server
    would require a user to acknowledge access the first time through a pop-up
    window or other means.
    
    Of course, if vendors made the default for every service "public" to 
    promote
    ease of use, it  wouldn't do much good.
    
    (Forgive the HTML mail if it comes through that way. I'm at home
    and wrestling with new browsers/mail clients.)
    
    >  
    >
    
    
    
    
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