RE: First time security issue.

From: Dowling, Gabrielle (dowlinggat_private)
Date: Sun Jul 27 2003 - 22:01:38 PDT

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    Some other things....
    
    From Symantec's description, Pinfi is a network aware worm, so if
    someone with adequate privileges go infected, it would have dropped
    itself there.  You have to look at virus detections in unexpected places
    (and certainly your PDC would be such), as a clue you've got a problem
    elsewhere, and here it seems clear that you've got another infected  box
    used by someone with serious privileges, or you've got bad practices
    being done by people who have direct access to the box in question.
    
    I would think that whether or not your PD is internet facing (and that
    depends largely on your firewall configs), should guide you on finding
    how the incursion occurred.
    
    Same deal with the Mirc channel trojan dropper.  McAfee describes it as
    this:  http://vil.nai.com/vil/content/v_100427.htm.  
    
    The latter is more than a little troubling, and maybe it was used to
    introduce the former, but I really wouldn't rule out very bad practices.
    
    
    The critical question is whether  Pinfi was detected by real time or
    scheduled scanning.  If the latter, and if  (and it seems it must have
    been) been executed with Domain Admin privileges, then  you've got to do
    a sweep as its probably sitting silently on all your servers (and
    perhaps all your workstations, depending on your config)>
    T
    
    It's also troubling that you had a Pinfi detection at all, it is not
    prevalent.
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Giles Coochey [mailto:gilesat_private] 
    Sent: Sunday, July 27, 2003 8:11 AM
    To: gillettdavidat_private; benat_private;
    incidentsat_private
    Subject: Re: First time security issue.
    
    
    
    
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    On Tuesday 22 July 2003 5:01 pm, David Gillett wrote:
    >   Many admins will find the temptation to try and save themselves the 
    > effort too hard to resist.  Especially if they don't really have a 
    > "good" backup.
    >   But unless you've got logs you're not mentioning, you
    > don't really know what the intruder did or how far he got before the 
    > antivirus kicked in.
    >
    >   So I'd say format, reload, verify, and harden the box before putting
    
    > it back on line.
    >
    > David Gillett
    >
    
    Actually, he cannot do that directly. Take the machine off the network
    and 
    promote one of your BDCs, (if you have any) to a PDC. If you don't have
    any 
    BDCs then either you'll have to start a domain from scratch or you'll
    have to 
    take the risk, build one and sync it with your compromised PDC. Now send
    out 
    an email to your users and inform them that they will all have to change
    
    their passwords. Go to user manager and set all users to "User must
    change 
    password at next logon".
    If anyone did gain access to your PDC and were able to read the registry
    then 
    they could have exported all users passwords hashes to a file and used a
    tool 
    such as l0phtcrack to begin cracking them. Without third-party, or
    extended 
    password strength libraries you will normally find that l0phtcrack gets
    about 
    75% of all users passwords from their hashes within about 30 seconds on 
    standard desktop hardware.
    
    
    > > -----Original Message-----
    > > From: benat_private [mailto:benat_private]
    > > Sent: July 21, 2003 10:48
    > > To: incidentsat_private
    > > Subject: First time security issue.
    > >
    > > Sorry if this post seems remedial, but I'm pretty new to security.  
    > > Last week out NT4 PDC detected a virus (Pinfi.a) and put it in 
    > > quaentine  as it should. While cleaning up the files, I noticed a 
    > > new folder in the  WINNT/System32
    > > directory: rmtcfg. It was filled with several .exe and  batch 
    > > scripts.  Evindetally, someone got in (with admin privledges) and 
    > > tried to setup a  IRC server using a IRC.Flood variant. Luckily, the
    
    > > virus protection  kicked in before he could finish setting up the 
    > > server.  I ran handle.exe, listdlls.exe, pslist.exe, fport.exe, and 
    > > netstat as  directed in "Detecting and Removing Trojans and 
    > > Malicious Code from Win2K."  My question is, since the system was 
    > > compromised and system files and the  registry have been 
    > > replaced/added too, am I just better off formatting  the system 
    > > partition and restoring from a good backup?  Thanks,
    > > --------------------------------------------------------------
    >
    > 
    >-----------------------------------------------------------------------
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    >
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