* Titus D. Winters (titusat_private) wrote: > > I understand what your driving at. But I hesitate to make logic changes to > > the kernel. Consider original code reads... > > > > if (p->uid != current->euid && > > p->uid != current->uid && !capable(CAP_SYS_NICE)) { > > > > This really doesn't have any test for root. just checks that both your uid > > and euid don't match the target process's uid _and_ you aren't capable. > > Well, if that is the way it is in the kernel, that's good. Still, since > we are changing the entire capabilities system anyway, it is a nice time > to make the system a bit smarter. I am reluctant to change logic in the kernel when I don't have a complete understanding for the rationale for why it is the way it is now. Call me paranoid, but subtle logic changes easily == security bugs. As a side note. Roy's proposal could incorrectly assign 0 to error > But I agree, if we are not going to watch for stuff like this then we > really need to examine the dummy functions. : ) Ooh, that sounds like a volunteer ;-) -chris _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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