Re: LSM Patch Additions for CAPP (C2) Audit Trails

From: Chris Wright (chrisat_private)
Date: Fri Jul 06 2001 - 10:11:39 PDT

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    * jmjonesat_private (jmjonesat_private) wrote:
    > 
    > On Thu, 5 Jul 2001, Crispin Cowan wrote:
    >  
    > > Ted agreed with the consensus the LSM list came to a few weeks ago:
    > > movking kernel logic out to a module is too intrusive and too
    > > risk-prone, so don't do it.
    > 
    > The original "move capabilities to a module" value that partly triggered 
    > LSM now seems somewhat inconsistant... we're not really doing that at all:
    > just *extending* capabilities support to a module, leaving it basicly
    > intact in the kernel, and treating it the same way we're treating any
    > other pre-existing kernel security mechanism: extending, not moving.
    
    capabilities represents a permissive security model.  we are capturing
    this model, and allowing capabilities to be a module.  so we are moving
    it to a module. i see no inconsistency.
    
    -chris
    
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