richard offer wrote: > * frm sarnoldat_private "08/13/01 11:56:20 -0700" | sed '1,$s/^/* /' > * > * On Sat, Aug 11, 2001 at 01:20:00AM +0000, David Wagner wrote: > *> Here we would have to tell admins that they can rmmod a LSM, but to > *> install a new LSM they have to reboot (or else kill all process that > *> might have used an extended syscall). The need to reboot every time > *> you rmmod a LSM seems pretty ugly. > * > * But it does make sense to ask the admins to stop running module-specific > * applications when changing modules. > > You mean like ls or id or sendmail or X or ...... Basically it will boil > down to having to do a reboot, so why not say it. If "you" hack ls, id, sendmail, and X to: * Use special features of a particular module through the syscall interface * be stateful with respect to the module * be brittle such that they break if the module goes away and then expect these apps to continue working (for some value of "work") if the module is removed without warning, then I submit that "you" are also responsible for providing a locking mechanism for the module. Crispin -- Crispin Cowan, Ph.D. Chief Scientist, WireX Communications, Inc. http://wirex.com Security Hardened Linux Distribution: http://immunix.org Available for purchase: http://wirex.com/Products/Immunix/purchase.html _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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