* Stephen Smalley (sdsat_private) wrote: > > On Thu, 25 Oct 2001, richard offer wrote: > > > With no subsequent discussion following posting of the last patch (which > > incorporated changes to meet Chris's suggestions) all the issues appear to > > have been put to bed so there should be no reason for not moving forward > > with this. > > And now, for a non-technical comment, when the LSM patch is submitted to > the kernel developers for consideration into 2.5, we will need to be able > to provide evidence that the changes made by LSM are needed by real > security modules. I would expect even greater need for concrete justification > for the kinds of changes made by the authoritative hooks patch, since it > is more invasive and increases the likelihood that a security module may > accidentally open a vulnerability in the base logic. For the current LSM > patch, we have concrete open source examples such as the capabilities > module, the SELinux module and the DTE module (and more underway by the > IBM folks, right?). For authoritative hooks, we currently have nothing. > And I don't think a trivial example module would be helpful - we need > a real security module that is open source that demonstrates the need for > these additional changes. I don't think that the kernel developers will > be swayed by hand waving about unreleased or closed source security > modules. this is _exactly_ my main concern! i, personally, like the idea of starting with the easy to understand restrictive hooks, and as we gain credibility push for authoritative. -chris _______________________________________________ linux-security-module mailing list linux-security-moduleat_private http://mail.wirex.com/mailman/listinfo/linux-security-module
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