Re: Reasons for Inclusion

From: Jesse Pollard (pollardat_private)
Date: Fri Mar 22 2002 - 13:34:23 PST

  • Next message: jmjonesat_private: "Re: Reasons for Inclusion"

    jmjonesat_private:
    > 
    > Has anybody written a paper, or a list, or a set of notes that respond to
    > the following question, yet?
    > 
    > "
    > Since secure-systems are a minority of installed systems, and the LSM code
    > works exceptionally well with a common-patch, why should this patch enter
    > into the "official" code tree for Linux and not simply track it as a
    > shared resource for secure-system developers, developed outside the 'stock
    > kernel' tree?
    > "
    > 
    > Risking My Unpopularity
    > To Ask a Question Early,
    > That Will CERTAINLY Be Asked Eventually,
    > Hopefully to get some REALLY GOOD REASONS (RGR's),
    > J. Melvin Jones
    > 
    > P.S. -- I'm an easily beaten "gat-fly". :)
    
    How about:
    
    One reason secure systems are a minority is that the administrators and users
    are not aware that higher levels of security are even possible.
    
    In many cases, they may hear of "trusted computing" or perhaps even "orange
    book B1" (or the new buzphrase "trustworty computing"). But without an example
    of one it is impossible to determine if such a beast would be usefull. Much
    less learn how to use it.
    
    Once an implementation (or in our case, hooks) become standard, it becomes
    much easier to add a module, configure it, and evaluate the result. This
    breeds understanding. Understanding of multiple security models will expand
    the range of security awareness, and lead to more secure systems being
    implemented and actually used.
    
    There will need to be a lot of documentation and "how to" texts written, but
    that will come with/when knowlegeable administrators try them out, and ask
    questions.
    
    It also will expand the confidence of some administrators just knowing that
    if it DID become necessary/mandatory, it is possible to increase the security
    level of the system.
    
    In some environments it is already mandated to have more security than that
    defined as "C2", but it isn't being done just because "it isn't standard"
    or "it's too expensive" (the usual answer I get :).
    
    Several medical databases are/have been implemented on multiple servers, with
    disjoint data bases/networks simply because there are so few systems that
    CAN be made more secure. This introduces errors (and expesive hardware
    duplication) becuase data must be entered two or more times, once for each
    database.
    
    -------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Jesse I Pollard, II
    Email: pollardat_private
    
    Any opinions expressed are solely my own.
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