Re: [logs] Due Diligence for Admission in Court

From: todd glassey (todd.glasseyat_private)
Date: Wed Dec 05 2001 - 13:38:47 PST

  • Next message: Brian Hatch: "[logs] Re: Untamperable logs" 

    Bennet's right about PFS - however Perfect Forward Secrecy is a real pain in
distributed systems to implement, but it is doable.

Todd
----- Original Message -----
From: "Bennet S. Yee" <bsyat_private>
To: <loganalysisat_private>
Cc: "todd glassey" <todd.glasseyat_private>
Sent: Wednesday, December 05, 2001 1:33 PM
Subject: Re: [logs] Due Diligence for Admission in Court


> signing key can be exposed or (mis)used by an insider long after the
> log is initially created, so there is a chance that the log has been
> tampered with.  forward secure cryptography may be used, so that any
> tampering must have been planned (and initiated) prior to the creation
> of the long entry.  done properly, even an insider (or an attacker who
> takes complete control of the system) cannot tamper with the logs
> undetected.
>
> -bsy
> --------
> Bennet S. Yee Phone: +1 858 534 4614 Email: bsyat_private
> (i often don't capitalize due to tendonitis)
> Web: http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/~bsy/
> USPS: Dept of Comp Sci and Eng, 0114, UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA
92093-0114
>


---------------------------------------------------------------------
To unsubscribe, e-mail: loganalysis-unsubscribeat_private
For additional commands, e-mail: loganalysis-helpat_private

    This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Wed Dec 05 2001 - 14:56:35 PST