Re: [logs] Due Diligence for Admission in Court

From: todd glassey (todd.glasseyat_private)
Date: Wed Dec 05 2001 - 13:38:47 PST

  • Next message: Brian Hatch: "[logs] Re: Untamperable logs"

    Bennet's right about PFS - however Perfect Forward Secrecy is a real pain in
    distributed systems to implement, but it is doable.
    
    Todd
    ----- Original Message -----
    From: "Bennet S. Yee" <bsyat_private>
    To: <loganalysisat_private>
    Cc: "todd glassey" <todd.glasseyat_private>
    Sent: Wednesday, December 05, 2001 1:33 PM
    Subject: Re: [logs] Due Diligence for Admission in Court
    
    
    > signing key can be exposed or (mis)used by an insider long after the
    > log is initially created, so there is a chance that the log has been
    > tampered with.  forward secure cryptography may be used, so that any
    > tampering must have been planned (and initiated) prior to the creation
    > of the long entry.  done properly, even an insider (or an attacker who
    > takes complete control of the system) cannot tamper with the logs
    > undetected.
    >
    > -bsy
    > --------
    > Bennet S. Yee Phone: +1 858 534 4614 Email: bsyat_private
    > (i often don't capitalize due to tendonitis)
    > Web: http://www-cse.ucsd.edu/~bsy/
    > USPS: Dept of Comp Sci and Eng, 0114, UC San Diego, La Jolla, CA
    92093-0114
    >
    
    
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