RE: [logs] NT Logs

From: Eric Fitzgerald (ericfat_private)
Date: Tue Feb 12 2002 - 14:40:24 PST

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    Gonzalo,
    
    If you are generating object access events too rapidly then you need to
    re-evaluate your audit policy or your SACL policy.
    
    Event 560 means that an application requested (from the OS) access to an
    object.  You don't give a sample event so I can't say what kind of
    object is being accessed.
    
    Event 562 means that the application released the handle to the object.
    
    Events 560 and 562 are generated when (1) the "Object Access" audit
    category is enabled for Success or Failure auditing (562 can only be a
    success audit), AND (2) the object being accessed has a SACL which
    overlaps with the user requesting access and the actual access that was
    requested.
    
    The most common reasons that we see large numbers of 560 and 562 events
    are:
    1) [Usually following the recommendation in the NSA guide] The
    administrator enabled the security policy option "Audit access to base
    system objects".  This causes a SACL to be placed on kernel objects such
    as mutexes when they are created, and results in a very large number of
    object access audits being generated during normal operation of the
    system.  Unless you *need* these events, I recommend that you do NOT
    enable this setting.
    
    2) Flawed SACL policy on the file system or registry, such as a broad
    SACL (Everyone:Full:S+F) applied at the root of the registry hive or
    volume and propagated to the entire tree.  SACLs should be set very
    narrowly, only on the objects of interest, and should only audit
    accesses that represent a threat to system security (for example, a user
    reading a .INI file for an application is not a threat, a user writing
    to such a file would be, so an appropriate SACL to monitor this threat
    would only include specific accesses that imply a write such as
    WRITE_DATA, WRITE_DAC, and DELETE).
    
    Please let me know if you have any more questions.
    
    Eric Fitzgerald
    Program Manager, Windows Auditing & Intrusion Detection
    Microsoft Corporation
    
    
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Gonzalo Garcia [mailto:GO_GARCIAat_private] 
    Sent: Thursday, February 07, 2002 11:46 AM
    To: loganalysisat_private
    Subject: RE: [logs] NT Logs
    
    
    <snip>
    
    When I start to test the script I've found this problem: the DCs (about
    50 country wide), generate logs faster than I can read, most of them are
    560 562 events, according with this trend in a few time I'll be missing
    many logs entries.
    
    Does any of you know the meaning of the EventID 560 and EventID 562 ?
    When are and why are they generated ? Is there any way to stop this logs
    events ? Should I miss too many information doing this ?
    
    
    
    <snip>
    
    The audit policies are:
    ------------------------
    
    Audit account logon events ( Success, Failure )
    Audit account management ( Success, Failure )
    Audit directory service access ( Success, Failure )
    Audit login events	( Success, Failure )
    Audit object access ( Success, Failure )
    Audit policy change ( Success, Failure )
    Audit privilege use ( Success, Failure )
    Audit process tracking ( No auditing )
    Audit system events ( Success, Failure )
    
    
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