RE: [logs] hack attempts && price

From: Lubomir.Nistor@star-21.de
Date: Mon Mar 04 2002 - 01:37:32 PST

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    that's right, you have to do prevention, but how do you explain a non-educated man what AIDS is? he doesn't even know what a virus is. And telling him that he needs to use condome if it's not convenient for him needs some persuation effords..
    why should he waste his money on something he didn't use before? 
    that's the same possition of a IT manager.. he doesn't know what is the price of a hack attack and why should he waste money on something that he didn't do before and he is not convenient with?
    
    I've read a good book called selfish gene.. it explains the theory about evolution..
    where bad decisions or strategies lead to death of that specific nature of genes or habits.
    SO if companies go bankrupt due to hack attacks and IT managers who caused this wouldn't get a job as IT manager (that's bad assumption), only good IT managers would survive and be allowed reproduce (i mean the knowhow :) to guarantee supply of good IT managers in future :)
    
    lubo
    
    
    
    
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: dgillettat_private [mailto:dgillettat_private]
    Sent: Dienstag, 26. Februar 2002 23:00
    To: loganalysisat_private
    Subject: RE: [logs] hack attempts && price
    
    
    On 26 Feb 2002, at 10:49, Lubomir.Nistor@star-21.de wrote:
    
    > but back to the price of hack attacks..
    
      I have this niggling idea that this is a fundamentally flawed 
    metric.
      (THE recurring problem in Metrics is that people home in on things 
    that are *easy* to count/measure, but not necessarily *important* to 
    count/measure.)
    
      In security (like defense and intelligence and -- at least in some 
    views -- law enforcement and medicine), the goal should be PREVENTION 
    rather than CURE.
      And that means that ongoing activities such as Log Analysis need to 
    be done, routinely, regardless of the level of hostile activity being 
    blocked.
    
      The cost of an unblocked intrusion is known to be high.  I don't 
    have the numbers in front of me about how many enterprises never 
    recover from a major security breach, but anyone who hasn't seen them 
    can find them easily enough.  To use a medical analogy, successful 
    infections are, in this field, overwhelmingly fatal.
      The benefit of a preventive regime is that it keeps the incidence 
    of successful infection low.  But most preventive efforts need to be 
    sustained all the time, and specific defensive action against 
    specific threats should be relatively rare.  (To continue the medical 
    analogy, this is issuing anthrax vaccine to postal workers.)
      Another possible analogy is insurance.  While some people still buy 
    special insurance each time they fly, most don't -- and *nobody* buys 
    short-term car insurance each time they drive.
    
      Most people who take vitamin C, for instance, take it daily, rather 
    than whenever they expect to encounter strangers.  Trying to relate 
    the cost of taking the vitamin to the number of strangers one meets 
    doesn't, I think, yield numbers that are really useful.
    
    David Gillett
    
    
    
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