Hi all, I am currently designing a secure central log host. Obviously, I face a number of challenges. One thing I hold for important is the location of the database used to store the repository. Obviously, my central log server will be a hardened machine placed in a secure part of my network. So I feel bad about placing the database engine on that same machine - after all, the DB might be queried by security admins to work with it. So I would need to open up a number of ports that I do not really like to open.... Another approach is to have a second machine just running the database. Then, again two options. I can allow the first machine ("collector") to talk to the database server ("repository") via the native database protocol. Thus the collector is a "regular" database client - I need to open up some ports, but definitely no server ports. All events are stored in the repository and queried by the admin from there. Fine - BUT: now the repository can of course be compromised and it might even compromise the collector over weaknesses in the db protocol. Bad. Ok, next approach: the collector forwards events to the repository via syslog protocol. No need to allow any db connectivity between the two. But again, the repository can be tampered by the admins. Also, on second thought, I have just introduced another relay (and point of failure). Mmmhhh - what if we run a database on the collector AND the repository? The one one the collector is not allowed to talk to the network so this should be secure. Events are forwarded to the repository via syslog, so this should again be fine. So here, we are actually back to a collector&repository in one and the second server is more or less a working copy for the security admins. I finally came up with the following idea: Collector - stores incoming events in flat files inside file system --> written to CD on a schedule - forwards via syslog to the repository machine Repository - stores incomign events in the database - this database is used for admin review. Conceptually, it is read-only, but if in doubt (or legal investigation), the flat files from the collector will be used Does this sound as overkill? Are there any other (proven) approches? Any advise or comment is highly appreciated. Rainer Gerhards _______________________________________________ LogAnalysis mailing list LogAnalysisat_private http://lists.shmoo.com/mailman/listinfo/loganalysis
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