>under the business records exception. In my >experience, judges just expect it, and as long as >no one makes a fuss, they'll admit the records. >Practically speaking, you just want the records >*in*, and you don't care what theory a judge buys >as to why it should be admitted. If the court >wants to admit the records under the business >records exception, then by all means, let them. I agree wholeheartedly, but I was going down the road to perdition, so to speak, wrt the use of the business records exception in the eventual case where 'someone makes a fuss' and the judge is forced to peel beyond that first layer and get to the core of that exception as applied to digital log evidence. And, that will occur when enough is at stake and the lawyers for a defendant juggernaut (MSFT, for instance) are not going to sit idly when it comes to ushering in damaging logfile evidence. >The trouble is, there's absolutely no reason why >whether computer logs are kept in the ordinary >course of business should matter to their >admissibility. In the hearsay context, the >"ordinary course of business" helps assure that >the person who took the records wasn't fudging Agree, but that has become the check-box threshold... which is not to say that it should be thrown-out entirely in this context, but perhaps another metric should be used instead of or complementary to the "ordinary course of business" standard. If courts rely on 'use in everyday business' as the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness that allows them to make the inferential leap to reliability, they may be bypassing the core issue of whether or not the function works correctly and produced accurate results. > >as business records. When not, try to admit >them as business records, but then be ready to >argue that actually there's no hearsay at all, and >that the proper question is authenticity, not >hearsay. Getting to the latter argument, it becomes a question of what are the circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness of log evidence in the digital environment? Erin Erin Kenneally, M.F.S., J.D. Forensic Analyst University of California San Diego San Diego Supercomputer Center Pacific Institute for Computer Security 9500 Gilman Dr., La Jolla, CA 92093-0505 Phone: (858) 822-0991 http://security.sdsc.edu Fax: (858) 534-5077 _______________________________________________ LogAnalysis mailing list LogAnalysisat_private http://lists.shmoo.com/mailman/listinfo/loganalysis
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