L0pht 'Domino' Vulnerability is alive and well

From: Aleph One (aleph1at_private)
Date: Mon Jul 05 1999 - 13:33:58 PDT

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    This information was forwarded to Security Focus by someone
    that requested to be anonymous.
    
    http://www.l0pht.com/advisories/domino3.txt
    
    It seems nine months after L0pht posted their advisory on file view
    problems in Lotus Notes, the problem is alive and well. So well in fact
    that doing a simple query via a search engine found dozens of *very* high
    profile web servers open. Everything from Military sites, political
    parties, police departments and even software vendors. This is a follow-up
    to the Advisory published by the L0pht in October 1998.
    
    Data that can be accessed by unauthorized users may include: usernames,
    server names and IP addresses, dial-up server phone numbers,
    administration logs, files names, and data files (including credit card
    information, proprietary corporate data, and other information stored in
    eCommerce related databases.)  In some instances, it may be possible for
    an unauthorized user to modify these files or perform server
    administration functions via the web administration interface.
    
    The directory browsing "feature" is invoked when a user appends "?open" to
    a Domino URL. ex. http://www.example.com/?open.  If the server is
    vulnerable, it will display the contents of the webroot directory.  In          situations where multiple web sites are hosted on the same server, the
    unauthenticated user may be able to view data from any of these virtual
    servers.  This configuration weakness can be corrected by disabling
    database browsing.  The Lotus documentation suggests:
    
    1. From the Domino Administrator, click the Configuration tab, and open
       the Server document.
    2. Click the Internet Protocols - HTTP tab.
    3. In the "Allow HTTP clients to browse databases" field, choose No.
    4. Save the document.
    
    The database access issue is caused by improper ACLs over sensitive .nsf
    files on the Domino server.  For example, an unauthorized user may attempt
    to access the Name and Address Book by appending the database name to the
    Domino Server URL- http://example.com/names.nsf (this syntax invokes an
    explicit ?open command).  User created databases containing any variety of
    public or non-public information may be read if proper ACLs are not placed
    on these files.
    
    The following system files are potentially vulnerable: admin4.nsf,
    webadmin.nsf, certlog.nsf, log.nsf, names.nsf, catalog.nsf, domcfg.nsf,
    and domlog.nsf.  These files contain a wealth of information that may
    allow an unauthorized user to penetrate additional hosts and or networks.
    In some instances, these files may be modified by the attacker to change
    the intended behavior of the web site.  One particular example, cited by
    the L0pht in a January 1998 Advisory, demonstrates the ability to
    completely redirect all traffic destined for the vulnerable web site to a
    third party "evil" web site.
    
    To remedy this problem, it is suggested that each site running Domino web
    servers verify that proper ACLs have been placed on both custom and system
    related .nsf files. These recommendations should be considered not only
    for Internet connected Domino servers, but also for corporate Intranet
    servers.
    
    --
    Aleph One / aleph1at_private
    http://underground.org/
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