-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA1 ________________________________________________________________________ OpenPKG Security Advisory The OpenPKG Project http://www.openpkg.org/security.html http://www.openpkg.org openpkg-securityat_private openpkgat_private OpenPKG-SA-2002.005 26-Jun-2002 ________________________________________________________________________ Package: openssh Vulnerability: DoS / remote exploit OpenPKG Specific: no Affected Releases: OpenPKG 1.0 Affected Packages: <= openssh-3.0.2p1-1.0.2 Corrected Packages: >= openssh-3.0.2p1-1.0.3 Dependent Packages: - Description: According to an OpenSSH Security Advisory [5] and a corresponding Internet Security Systems (ISS) Security Advisory [6] there is a vulnerability within the "challenge-response" authentication mechanism in the OpenSSH daemon (sshd). This mechanism, part of the SSH2 protocol, verifies a user's identity by generating a challenge and forcing the user to supply a number of responses. It is possible for a remote attacker to send a specially-crafted reply that triggers an overflow. This can result in a remote denial of service attack on the OpenSSH daemon or a complete remote compromise. The OpenSSH daemon runs with superuser privilege, so remote attackers can gain superuser access by exploiting this vulnerability. OpenSSH supports the SKEY and BSD_AUTH authentication options. These are compile-time options. At least one of these options must be enabled before the OpenSSH binaries are compiled for the vulnerable condition to be present. So OpenPKG's OpenSSH is *not* vulnerable by default, because the S/Key authentication option is disabled ("%define with_skey no") by default. But if users enabled this manually when building the OpenPKG "openssh" package, OpenPKG's OpenSSH is vulnerable,too. Please check whether you are affected by running "<prefix>/bin/rpm -qa openssh". If you have the "openssh" package installed and its version is affected (see above), we recommend that you immediately upgrade it (see Solution). Additionally, we recommend that you rebuild and reinstall all dependent OpenPKG packages, too. [2] Solution: Select the updated source RPM appropriate for your OpenPKG release [4], fetch it from the OpenPKG FTP service [3] or a mirror location, verify its integrity [1], build a corresponding binary RPM from it and update your OpenPKG installation by applying the binary RPM [2]. For the latest OpenPKG 1.0 release, perform the following operations to permanently fix the security problem (for other releases adjust accordingly). $ ftp ftp.openpkg.org ftp> bin ftp> cd release/1.0/UPD ftp> get openssh-3.0.2p1-1.0.3.src.rpm ftp> bye $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --checksig openssh-3.0.2p1-1.0.3.src.rpm $ <prefix>/bin/rpm --rebuild openssh-3.0.2p1-1.0.3.src.rpm $ su - # <prefix>/bin/rpm -Fvh <prefix>/RPM/PKG/openssh-3.0.2p1-1.0.3.*.rpm ________________________________________________________________________ References: [1] http://www.openpkg.org/security.html#signature [2] http://www.openpkg.org/tutorial.html#regular-source [3] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.0/UPD/ [4] ftp://ftp.openpkg.org/release/1.0/UPD/openssh-3.0.2p1-1.0.3.src.rpm [5] http://www.openssh.org/txt/preauth.adv [6] http://www.openssh.org/txt/iss.adv ________________________________________________________________________ For security reasons, this advisory was digitally signed with the OpenPGP public key "OpenPKG <openpkgat_private>" (ID 63C4CB9F) of the OpenPKG project which you can find under the official URL http://www.openpkg.org/openpkg.pgp or on http://keyserver.pgp.com/. To check the integrity of this advisory, verify its digital signature by using GnuPG (http://www.gnupg.org/). For instance, pipe this message to the command "gpg --verify --keyserver keyserver.pgp.com". ________________________________________________________________________ -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- Comment: OpenPKG <openpkgat_private> iEYEARECAAYFAj0aJCoACgkQgHWT4GPEy59flwCfaxMTjP1YZDbT7ukOTqVOhdod 8cwAnjUQLaJfN/b4ZxM541N4Vu2NKrBl =Zmg+ -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Thu Jun 27 2002 - 16:09:19 PDT