[logs] Philosophical perspective on auditing

From: Brian Anon (brian_anonat_private)
Date: Sat Dec 14 2002 - 09:37:55 PST

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    Justin,
    
    The purpose of auditing is to prove what you say you are doing.
    
    Philogophically, think about a tree falling in a forest.  Does the tree 
    falling making a sound if no one is there to hear it?  One theory is "esse 
    est percipi" - to be is to be perceived.  This suggests that the tree (or 
    sound of it falling) does not exist unperceived.  A weaker form acknowledges 
    that the tree may exist unpercieved, but how can we claim to have knowledge 
    of it existing unperceived?
    
    Let's apply this theory of perception to intrusion detection (or 
    logging/monitoring of any sort).  How can anyone claim to have knowledge of 
    events occuring (such as extended use of privileges) unperceived?  Without 
    auditing it will not be possible to proove the state of extended privilege 
    use to determine if there is a problem or not.  With this knowledge, 
    management can make informed decisions.
    
    If you tell a customer you do 'X', how do you proove 'X' is actually 
    hapening?
    
    I consider the field of information security to be about cost effectively 
    mitigating risks to acceptable levels.  The common practice is to layer 
    controls that will deter, prevent, detect or react to security incidents.
    
    Despite all the preventative controls in place, 100% security is not 
    achievable.  100% security is not the objective.  A company should plan to 
    react to security incidents that are not prevented for whatever reason.  
    This is why companies establish business continuity plans, disaster 
    recovery, and incident response teams.  Inadequately detecting the incident 
    may delay or prevent any response.  Spending on reactive controls will not 
    be effective without corresponding detective controls.
    
    Is your manager prepared for security incidents to go undetected?  You 
    cannot respond to what you don't know.
    
    Regads,
    Brian
    
    >I am trying to explain to a manager (non technical) about audit but una=
    >ble
    >to get through him the point below.  I tried and tried but unsucessful.=
    >   I
    >am looking for some plain English with examples to show to him.  Any
    >advise/info is appreciated.
    >
    >Auditing makes it possible to do the following:
    >=B7     Discover extended use of privilege that occurs when a user chan=
    >ges
    >identity.  How is this done ? how does a user outside of Unix change
    >identity ?
    
    
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