Industry Definitions... possible? was Re: Security Audit

From: Don Bailey (baileydlat_private)
Date: Fri Sep 14 2001 - 07:02:43 PDT

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    All,
    
    I've just caught up on this thread and its been very interesting to
    read, especially since we just recently started a discussion on the
    osstmm discussion list with regard to defining the following terms:
    security test, security assessment, security audit, penetration test,
    vulnerability assessment.  Personally, I feel that these terms are used
    incorrectly most of the time, and in attempt to capture their nuances I
    made a crack shot at definitions.  Note that my attempt at definitions
    were without the benefit of several weeks of pen-test list
    discussion--which I sorely regret not previously absorbing.
    
    Granted, there's plenty of room to simply argue that this is all just an
    exercise in semantics and my definitions posted to the osstmm discussion
    list may just cloud the issue (that's not my intention I assure
    you)--they may be considered way off in fact or flat out wrong.  I'm
    willing to hear those opinions (even flames), in the hopes it will
    better shape the osstmm.  Following is the relevant post which I feel
    speaks to a search for the correct type of testing at the correct time.
    
    Sincerely,
    
    Don
    
    -------- Original Message --------
    Subject: Definitions Re: [OSSTMM-Discussion] new tests and stuff
    Date: Thu, 13 Sep 2001 14:03:53 -0400
    From: Don Bailey <baileydlat_private>
    Organization: The MITRE Corporation
    To: peteat_private
    CC: OSSTMM Discussion
    <ospentest-discussionat_private>,OSSTMM News
    <ospentest-newsat_private>
    References: <FEENJDOHIDLOEIFPBFCMMEAICEAA.peteat_private>
    
    pete wrote:
    > 
    <snip side thread on steganography>
    > I would also like to clarify some definitions for the industry.  Perhaps
    
    I've lost some sleep over this already, so I'll start taking a crack at
    it... hang on!
    
    > security test
    > security assessment
    > security audit
    
    First of all, I see these three as supersets of the other two.  Also, as
    these three are listed, I see them as nearly the same but progressively
    more intense with varying degrees of relevance with regard to policy,
    officiality, etc.  Therefore, it IS important to define each seperately
    and not just clump them together with some phrase such as "Oh...it's all
    the same thing.", which is what I hear too often.  
    
    Security Test:
    A security test would be a routine and general test of an organization's
    network security mechanisms, from outside in, to obtain a basic and
    generally accurate idea of how well the organization has implemented
    said security mechanisms.  No prior warning is given to any employees. 
    The test may be performed "in house" with existing networking
    personnel.  Results from a security test generally would be used to make
    functional network "tweaks" to remedy any unexpected problems discovered
    and bring the network back to spec.
    
    Security Assessment:
    A security assessment is an intensified security test in scope and
    effort, the purpose of which is to obtain an advanced and very accurate
    idea of how well the organization has implemented network security
    mechanisms and to some degree policy (such as spot tests of password
    strengths or acceptable allowed services).  No prior warning is given to
    non-critical employees.  Outside technical assistance may be necessary
    to handle the workload and should be seriously considered.  The results
    of a security assessment may be surprising or unexpected and would be
    used to make significant changes to both network implementations and
    policy.
    
    Security Audit:
    A security audit would be an extreme security test, definitely handled
    by an outside and impartial source, that performs a ground up, and
    outside in, audit of the organization's network security mechanisms and
    all pages of security policy.  Audit implies finding non-compliance with
    policy.  All employees are informed well ahead of time in order to meet
    compliance with policy.  They are interviewed by auditers with regard to
    their knowledge of policy and their personal level of compliance.  The
    results of a security audit should NOT be surprising, SHOULD only
    validate existing implementations with regard to known policy, and
    violations are to be taken very seriously, to include possible
    termination of employment of individuals in direct violation of policy
    or responsible for sections found in direct violation of policy. 
    Extraneous results that are not covered by existing policy should be
    addressed individually and considered for future policy changes and
    security assessments.   
    
    Note that these definitions may incorporate the use of the word
    "network" and I apologise if I focused on that a bit more than I should
    have, but that's my realm, so I'm biased.  Perhaps these definitions can
    be sanitized by the removal of the word "network" to be made more
    general yet accurate and for specific "network" related actions we can
    say "network security test", "network security assessment", and "network
    security audit".  These latter definitions extremely limit scope...
    which may actually be preferred in some instances.
    
    > penetration test
    
    Penetration Test:
    A penetration test is a no-holds barred, outside to inside, get in any
    way and as many ways as you can, test of an organizations physical,
    network, and human facets of security.  This is Red Teaming. 
    Non-critical employees may or may not be notified in advance of a
    pen-test.  A Blue Team may or may not be involved for active defense.  A
    White Team may or may not be involved to referee the event.  Rules of
    engagement are defined ahead of time for at least the Red Team and by
    individuals authorizing the activity.  Specific exclusions may be
    introduced to the pen-test, such as no testing of physical or human
    facets of the organization's security (i.e. no lock-picking and no
    social engineering).  Variations on this model of testing may be
    "capture the flag" in which the Red Team has but one type of document to
    find or alter--a proof of concept crack attempt, if you will--in order
    to be successful or call and end to the event.  Also "cry uncle" is
    common, in which an onslaught of near-destructive activity to an
    organisation is so great as to test the limits of the Blue Team's
    response capabilities, demonstrate for CEOs or corporate-types how bad
    it could get, until someone in authority simply says, "that's enough...
    we get the point."  Some or all of these variations may occur during a
    pen-test.  Results of a pen-test are almost always surprising and
    unfair, but are significant in helping to reshape policy, highlight the
    significance of consistently present security flaws, discover previously
    unknown weaknesses, as well as testing the resolve and ingenuity of Blue
    Team members in the organization.  Pen-test is commonly but incorrectly
    used synonymously with "security test", "security audit", "vulnerability
    assessment", et al.  It is closely related to a "security assessment"
    but a penetration test is a very different and distinct variation of the
    security assessment and should be recognized as such.  
    
    > vulnerability assessment
    
    Vulnerabiltiy Assessment:
    A vulnerability assessment is very regulated, controlled, cooperative,
    and documented evaluation of an organization's network security posture
    from both outside-in and inside-out, for the purpose of defining or
    greatly enhancing security policy, and determining the need or removal
    of security products / implementations.  Non-critical employees are not
    included in a vulnerability assessment.  "Defense-in-Depth" will be the
    phrase du jour during this event, and all types of corporate individuals
    will be included to participate in discussions with regard to the
    neccessity of security versus the need for functionality and
    productivity.  The techies are often involved with or responsible for
    product evaluation, providing their results to analysts that write
    recommendation reports.  Corporate politics are involved and many
    sub-organizations may prove defensive or outraged with regard to noted
    deficiencies or recommended security implementations.  Outside technical
    assistance with evaluating the organization's security posture is
    recommended, but be wary of consultants that bring their product to the
    table as THE solution to the results of a vulnerability assessment. 
    Tasks may include offline testing or evaluation of existing or
    anticipated security products, network profiling to determine critical
    assets or subnets, independent code review of implemented scripts and
    software, and security budget analysis.  A vulnerability assessment may
    take months to nearly a year to complete, and the focus should be on
    completing an unbiased and scientific evaluation of the organization's
    security posture with regard to its current and near-future models of
    real-world operation.  Results of a vulnerability assessment should be
    the definition or ehancement of an organization's security policy, and
    implementation plan for new security products & measures to mitigate
    defined vulnerabilities and/or the removal of ineffective products &
    measures.  A vulnerability assessment is commonly combined, brought on
    by, or followed by a security assessment but does not require such an
    activity in order to be conducted, complete, or successful. 
    
    Crap.  That's my first shot at defining these.  There's a good bit of
    the wording I'm still not comfortable with, but I think I got my general
    ideas on the table.  Have fun hacking / editing this.  I hope this
    begins some fruitful dialogue with regard to locking down these
    definitions.
    --end-- 
    
    H C wrote:
    > 
    <snip>
    > fruition without being detected.  Security consulting
    > firms should have this as their goal, as well, with
    > respect to their clients.  This being said, what has
    > been referred to as a "blind pen test" quickly drops
    > out of the picture all together as a method of
    > reaching this goal.  A vulnerability assessment of the
    > overall infrastructure examines the configurations of
    > hosts within that infrastructure, the relationship
    > between the hosts, and the processes and procedures
    > used by the admins.  The assessment gets into every
    > nook and cranny and peeks into the deep, dark corners.
    >  Verification testing (ie, "full disclosure pen test")
    > can be done once recommended changes have been put in
    > place.
    > 
    > Attempting to break in blindly using no more
    > information than a domain name is not something that
    > can be completed in a week or two for larger
    > infrastructures, and leaves many items unchecked.
    > However, a "blind pen test" can be used at a later
    > date to test the effectiveness of detection, as well
    > as incident response procedures.  At that point,
    > conducting such a test with full knowledge of the
    > infrastructure would definitely be very beneficial.
    > 
    > Thanks for your time.  Thoughts/comments appreciated.
    
    --
    Don Bailey
    Senior INFOSEC Engineer/Scientist
    Secure Information Technology
    The MITRE Corporation
    
    
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