client puzzle protocol

From: Michael B. Rash (mbrat_private)
Date: Mon Feb 14 2000 - 20:36:53 PST

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    http://www.rsasecurity.com/rsalabs/staff/ajuels/papers/clientpuzzles.pdf 
    
    So basically RSA seems to think that this technology could be used to help
    stop the recent DoS attacks that gained so much media attention, but
    either I am not understanding something, or they have made a mistake in
    their architecture.
    
    The technology can be summarized by the following excerpt from the
    paper's abstract: 
    
    "...TCP SYN flooding is an example of a connection depletion attack in
    which an attacker... <snip>.  We introduce a countermeasure
    that we refer to as a client puzzle protocol.  When a server comes under
    attack, it distributes small cryptographic puzzles to clients making
    service requests.  To complete its request, a client must solve its puzzle
    correctly..."
    
    OK.  First of all, "distributes puzzles" implies that the attacking
    machine is listening for them in the first place, which most likely it 
    will not be (the TCP SYN packets would most likely be spoofed 
    anyway... where do they think they are going to "send the puzzle"?).  An
    attacking machine simply needs to create a bunch of SYN packets and get
    them to the target, who will then begin generating the corresponding
    SYN-ACK packets thereby overflowing its connection buffers.  That's
    it... that is the whole attack.  The only advantage in doing something
    like the client puzzle protocol would be to limit the number of
    *legitimate* connections that a machine could make since the 
    computationally expensive cryptographic puzzles would start eating lots of
    compute cycles if it tried to initiate 10,000 connections.  If I'm an
    attacker I don't care about legitimate connections... I don't even care if
    I see *any* packet return from the target.
    
    What am I missing?  How would the CPP help to prevent DoS attacks?
    
    (Note of course that we are talking about both a client and server side 
    modification to make all of this possible in the first place... sounds
    like an upcoming product from RSA).
    
    
    --Mike                        | "...the whole aim of practical politics is
                                  | to keep the populace alarmed (and hence
    http://www.math.umd.edu/~mbr  | clamorous to be led to safety) by an
                                  | endless series of hobgoblins..."  -Mencken
    



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