Well, we're just waiting for a customer with enough money and a need for
one of these, and then we'd be glad to build one and demonstrate for sure
how fast it goes.
Just kidding, just kidding :-) Saddam Hussein needn't call us.
Michal Zalewski wrote:
> My guess is that you'd actually need much more than 30 seconds to reach
> significant percentage of vulnerable machines at all, due to network
> outages, overloaded links, and so on, and so on. Then, because both
> network structure (firewalling, routing) and system configuration is, heh,
> more than diverse, it significantly delimits number of "vulnerable hosts"
> that can be automatically attacked and successfully exploited.
Agreed - we're only talking about saturation of the hosts that can actually
be attacked from the Internet, are vulnerable to whatever exploit the worm
has, are currently connected to the Internet, and have publically routable
static Internet addresses. What we're arguing is that the worm can reach
all of those hosts that it's going to reach in O(30secs) if it's small and
uses the kind of strategies we discuss.
I would
> argue that it is not very likely for us to see a worm that reaches
> "saturation level" in less than 10-20 hours, and that attacks more than
> 1,000,000 hosts, even according to very enthusiastic guesses (which are
> probably at least 50% overestimated) in next two years. Of course, I won't
> bet anything on that =)
I would bet against if you would :-)
Stuart.
--
Stuart Staniford --- President --- Silicon Defense
** Silicon Defense: Technical Support for Snort **
mailto:stuartat_private http://www.silicondefense.com/
(707) 445-4355 x 16 (707) 445-4222 (FAX)
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